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 This study assesses the impact of functional 
requirements for the Transformable Craft project, sponsored 
by the Office of Naval Research.  Although focused on the 
“game changing” nature of these requirements, this study 
provides a framework for analysis of generic logistics 
connectors, sea basing alternatives, and force structures by 
means of operational scenarios and simple simulation and 
analysis tools.  This study demonstrates the means by which 
these tools can assist military decision makers in 
understanding complex and high level issues. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2005, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) issued a 
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for a prototype 
Transformable Craft (T-Craft) that can deploy in an 
unloaded condition from an intermediate support base to a 
Seabase and then be used as a sea base connector, 
transporting wheeled and tracked vehicles, cargo, and 
personnel through the surf zone and onto the beach.1  The 
research presented here is part of a larger study to build a 
concept of operation (CONOPS) that makes a case for the 
“game changing” capabilities a T-Craft would bring to 
enable Sea Basing, Operational Maneuvers from the Sea 
(OMFTS), and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). 
 
2. SCOPE OF WORK 
As part of the larger CONOPS effort, this study 
provides a quantitative assessment of the “game changing” 
value of high-level design requirements.   
In support of that objective, the authors developed a 
series of operational scenarios used to flex the capabilities 
of the logistics forces involved.  These scenarios represent a 
useable cross-section of challenges to expeditionary 
logistics and can be used as a baseline by which logistics 
connectors, sea base composition, and employment methods 
can be demonstrated.   
Furthermore, this study demonstrates how high-level 
issues can be assessed by relatively simple analysis tools; 
namely Microsoft Excel®, ExtendSim by Imagine That!™, 
and Google Earth™. 
 
3. REQUIREMENTS FRAMEWORK 
 ONR BAA #05-020 lists a series of desired capabilities, 
desired threshold/objectives, and other information relevant 
to the “game changing” capabilities of the T-Craft.  Desired 
capabilities addressed in this study are: 
1. Un-refueled range, in a no cargo condition, of 
2,500 nautical miles in a Fuel Efficient/ Good Sea 
Keeping Mode (20 knots, through Sea State 5).  
2. Maximum Speed, full load condition in High 
Speed, Shallow Water Mode = ~40 knots through 
top end of Sea State 4.  
3. Maximum un-refueled, fully loaded range of 500-
600 nautical miles (40 knots, through Sea State 4).  
  
Desired threshold/goals addressed in this study are: 
1. Cargo payload weight of 300 LT (threshold), 750 
LT (objective). 
2. Crew size of 3 (threshold), 2 (objective). 
3. Beach slope climbing of .5% (threshold), 2% 
(objective). 
 
Other information considered in this study includes: 
1. No habitability/living spaces required. 
2. No organic capabilities to handle pallets, quad-
cons, or 20ft containers. 
 
4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
 In order to determine potential “game changing” 
capabilities a T-Craft might bring to the table, a series of 
operational scenarios were developed to flex these 
capabilities.  These scenarios represent a wide swath of the 
Range of Military Operations as found in JP 3-07 Joint 
Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.2  
Namely, the scenarios chosen are Major Theater War, 
Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement, Regional Conflict, and 
UN Security and Stability.  The scenarios were developed 
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with various sea base structures and ranges, shore base 
sizes, and situational dependent challenges.   
 Additionally, the authors incorporated threat scenarios 
developed by Naval Postgraduate School and Naval War 
College courses in order to present a feasible geo-political 
scenario that supports the scale of military operation 
depicted therein.  Sea base range, shore spot numbers, and 
scheme of maneuver were developed using geographic 
information systems (GIS) data on the operational 
environment. The background, scenario, and US military 
action is detailed for each operation below. 
  
4.1. Major Theater War 
4.1.1. Background 
Since the expulsion of UN inspectors in 2009, North 
Korea has been working to improve its nuclear arsenal and 
missile delivery systems.  Despite requests by the 
international community for North Korea to rejoin 
diplomatic talks, Pyongyang has continued its sabre-rattling, 
threatening military force could be used if economic 
equality with the South would not be obtained, or for threats 
against the country’s “inherent right of nuclear power and 
space exploration”. 
The situation in North Korea was made further 
unstable by the passing of Kim Jong Il in 2012 from 
complications secondary to diabetes.  His youngest and 
favorite son, Kim Jong Woon, had been heir apparent for 
many years, despite a lack of official notification to the 
Guidance Department of the ruling party.  After the sudden 
passing of Kim Jong Il’s, ruling officials were split on the 
order of succession.  Seizing power, Ri Chan Bok, 
commander of KPA forces along the demilitarized zone, 
used his position to usurp the party and install himself as the 
country’s new leader.  The General has often stated the 
“inevitability of war” with the US and South Korea over 
trade restrictions, and that the war would “begin on the 
Korean peninsula”.   
Despite six years of development, it is unlikely that 
nuclear weapons have been miniaturized adequately for 
missile employment, although KPA officials have hinted 
that this capability does exist.  However, North Korea’s 
missile development has continuously improved over these 
years.  Analysts suggested that North Korea had an untested 
variant of the Taepo Dong missile capable of reaching the 
west coast of the continental United States.   
In June of 2015, the DPK planned a test launch of the 
missile, again under the guise of placing a communications 
satellite into orbit.  Despite international pressure not to 
further its missile capability, particularly from the US who 
threatened to shoot down missiles perceived as a threat to 
the US and its allies, North Korea conducted the test launch 
on 15 June.  The missile was engaged by a TBMD capable 
US ship in the Pacific Ocean.  As a result, Ri Chan Bok has 
promised a “quick and decisive blow to the US and its 
puppet government to the south for this outrageous breach 
of international law.” 
4.1.2. Scenario 
Five days after the missile test, South Korean forces 
noticed unusual movements and routines of border forces.  
Increased aircraft routes and ground vehicle movements 
were noted of such magnitude that area commanders 
deduced that a major operation must be underway.  
Increasing WATCHCON and DEFCON in the area, 
Commander US Forces South Korea has requested 
mobilization of reinforcements to repel a probable North 
Korean assault. 
Two days later, KPA troops stormed the 
demilitarized zone under cover of darkness and a forming 
monsoon.  This meteorological combination negated the 
superiority of ROK and US air support, and allowed the 
KPA forces to overrun the demilitarized zone with forces 
amassed in underground collection areas.  Superior training 
and firepower has slowed the initial onslaught towards 
Seoul, but the scale of enemy troop levels has overwhelmed 
forces on the ground.  As expected, KPA troops have turned 
their sights on Seoul using short range missiles and rockets 
to amass casualties to soften resolve as it marches towards 
the city.  US and ROK forces can slow the onslaught until 
the weather clears air operations can be restored.  Air 
support should stop the assault until US reinforcements can 
amass.  Once the counteroffensive begins, forces shall 
destroy as much of the KPA forces, push them back past the 
DMZ, and continue on to Pyongyang and enable a 
reunification of the Korean peninsula under favorable terms. 
 
4.1.3. Action 
Reinforcement of Seoul is the first priority.  As such, 
the remainder of I Corps, namely the 25th Infantry Division, 
17th Fires Brigade, and 42nd MP Brigade will land near 
Inchon.  These forces will be augmented with the 75th 
Ranger Regiment.  These forces will be landed via T-Craft, 
meet up with US/ROK forces, and expel KPA forces.   
In the second phase, Task Force Cougar, comprised of 
the III MEF, 82nd Airborne Division, and 10th Mountain 
Division, will land near Gangneung.  Marine forces will 
land via ESG connectors, while Army units will land via 
aircraft at the regional airport.  After massing forces, the 
Task Force will drive north and repel DPK assaults on the 
DMZ and push on into North Korea. 
At this time, the majority of III Corps will be landed 
south of Wonsan, North Korea.  The Corps will be landed 
via T-Craft from MPF ships 250 nm to the south.  III Corps 
will “cross the T” of retreating DPK forces, then continue 
on to Pyongyang. 
Sea bases will be established in the Yellow Sea and 
Sea of Japan to support landings on both coasts of Korea.  
Due to the threat of DPK diesel submarines, the sea bases 
will be located 250 nm offshore, taxing the logistics 
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connectors to the maximum required range.  This submarine 
threat also prevents movement of undefended stores ships in 
the area.  As such, additional T-Craft will be used to 
replenish the sea base, making runs from the relatively close 
port of Fukuoka on the Japanese island of Kyushu.  Their 
speed and maneuverability will enable the T-Craft to 
operate largely unimpeded by the submarine threat without 
using scarce naval resources as convoy protection.  The 
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) will patrol 
their own territorial waters in the name of defense, but due 
to Korean political mistrust of the Japanese, their forces will 
not be used in combat roles. 
 
4.2. Peace Keeping / Peace Enforcement 
4.2.1. Background 
The year is 2025 and the Colombian Civil War has 
raged in the country for sixty years. The current elected 
president Mario Gutierrez Pedroza assumed the presidency 
of Colombia after a record low voter turnout. It seems the 
people of Colombia have lost total confidence in the 
democratic process and the Colombian Government. The 
Colombian economy is experiencing the worst crisis the 
country has seen. The level of violence in the country is 
unprecedented. During the past two years guerrillas and the 
San Jose Cartel murdered approximately 1,800 public 
officials including town mayors, federal and state 
legislators, judges, and prosecutors. More than 17,000 
people have been killed in 420 recorded massacres. 
The San Jose Cartel was born from the ashes of the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels, which were virtually dismantled 
in the year 2007.  In early 2012 a new drug called “magia” 
(magic) first appeared in the U.S.  Then, months later, 
magic made its debut in the European Union and Asia. The 
drug is a stimulant that accelerates physical and mental 
states, produces euphoria and eases physical and mental 
pain. In many cases, the user is prone to violent behavior. 
Today, the use of magic has reached epidemic proportions. 
It is estimated that in the US there are more than 15 million 
addicts and an estimated 80 million worldwide. The death 
toll in the U.S. attributed directly or indirectly to the use of 
magic has surpassed 500,000 since the appearance of the 
drug in 2012. 
With the advent of magic, the San Jose cartel has been 
able to establish an alliance with the Colombian insurgency 
movement, in particular the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC).  Soon after the 2013 government 
campaign against the rebels, the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) joined forces with the FARC, and the Common Front 
for the Liberation of Colombia (CFLC) was born. Today, 
the CFLC has become the security force for the San Jose 
Cartel. The CFLC has taken advantage of increased drug 
revenue and to build up their conventional arsenal, largely 
purchased from neighboring Venezuela. Last year, the 
annual CFLC income was estimated at over US $800 
million. 
The current situation in Colombia has taken its toll not 
only on the U.S., but also in the region. The political and 
economic instability of the neighboring countries has 
ignited the formation of a series of new narco-guerrilla 
groups. The violence is rapidly spreading to neighboring 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. With their respectable 
arsenal and forces, the San Jose Cartel and the CFLC’s 
objective is to continue to disrupt and eventually to 
overthrow the Colombian Government. The CFLC desires 
to establish a government that will allow the San Jose Cartel 
to continue to massively export magic worldwide, but 
particularly to the United States.   
 
4.2.2. Scenario 
In the last two years, the CFLC has practically crippled 
the Colombian Armed Forces. In a coordinated attack, 
CFLC forces infiltrated into four air force bases and 
destroyed most of the aircraft. Only the airbases at 
Barranquilla and Santa Maria were able to minimize the 
damage inflicted by the CFLC. The naval base at Puerto 
Tamuco was also attacked and 37 out of 41 patrol craft were 
seized by the guerrillas. Intelligence reported the possible 
deployment of floating mines in the ports of Buenaventura 
and Tamuco. Those reports were later confirmed by the 
sinking of the merchant ship Tulango after a mine explosion 
37 miles NW of Buenaventura. The Colombian Army has 
also suffered a series of devastating blows that practically 
left the CFLC in control of Colombia south of the 4th 
parallel. In addition, the CFLC has systematically destroyed 
most of the transportation infrastructure west of the 
Cordillera. The few usable roads are under heavy guerrilla 
guard and practically unsuitable for the transportation of 
heavy equipment. 
The United Nations Security Council has held several 
meetings over the instability in the region.  The US has 
sought a resolution (NSCR) calling for a UN peacekeeping 
force to restore the failed government, eliminate the CFLC 
and other cartels, and deal a blow to the drug trade by 
supporting stability and security to the region.  However, 
Russia, as Venezuela’s ally, has vetoed these efforts citing 
“US imperialists are seeking to restore their former 
oppressed provinces”.  Russia claims Venezuela is capable 
of leading a “Latin Partnership” capable of restoring 




Citing the Monroe Doctrine, the US intends to 
unilaterally insert a force capable of securing the country, 
destroy the drug cartels, resist possible Venezuelan 
influence, and ultimately restore a democratic government.   
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Elements of the 7th Special Forces Group will utilize El 
Dorado International Airport as an APOD to quickly enter 
the capital city of Bogota to reestablish a Colombian 
security force, conduct counter insurgency operations, and 
secure the city to enable an interim government to be 
established.   
Conventional forces to be inserted include the 2nd MEB 
embarked on the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Force, the 
10th Mountain Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division. The 
MEB will be inserted utilizing ARG connectors near the city 
of Covenas.  The geographic proximity to Venezuela will 
provide a deterrent from that country sending troops into 
Colombia.   
Meanwhile, the Army units will primarily be 
transported ashore via T-Craft, near the town of Tumaco on 
the southern coast in order to take advantage of the highway 
network that originates in the area.   Forces shall be staged 
at a sea base fifty miles offshore.  Initial objectives are 
known or suspected cartel operation areas.  Troops will 
drive inland to meet up with Ecuadorian troops acting as 
advisors and translators to US forces.  Utilizing these 
advisors to gain information on cartel operations, US troops 
shall continue to determine cartel operation areas, secure 
them, and restore local law enforcement. 
 
4.3. Regional Conflict 
4.3.1. Background 
The Kalimantan Republic became an independent 
nation in October 2002, when General Gegwan Riady 
proclaimed that the four Indonesian provinces on Borneo 
were seceding from Indonesia to create a new republic.  The 
secession was justified by claims that the Jakarta 
government was inadequately providing for the economic 
well being of the Kalimantan people.  Riady claimed 
specifically the central government’s failure to invest in 
Kalimantan infrastructure, as opposed to the vast wealth 
exported from the southern island’s reported vast petroleum 
stores.  The Jakarta government, unable to counter Riady’s 
move, begrudgingly acceded to Kalimantan’s declaration of 
independence.  After the accession, the Kalimantan 
Republic was generally accepted internationally, including 
by the United States. 
However, in the recent years the Kalimantan Republic 
has suffered a reversal in its economic fortunes since the 
collapse of the world petroleum market.  Economic worries 
deepened when improved survey techniques discovered that 
previous estimates of Kalimantan’s offshore energy reserves 
had been grossly overestimated.  Now seriously 
overextended, the Riady government suspended most of its 
“New Kalimantan” initiatives, including a number of 
tourism and infrastructure-related construction and 
development projects.  Suspension of these projects has lead 
to 40% unemployment.  This unemployment and 
intermittent civil disturbances, including food-line riots and 
dramatically increased level of crime, has hit the larger 
cities of Kalimantan. 
Riady sought financial aid from Malaysia and Brunei.  
But, with Kalimantan’s dept now totaling nearly $12 billion, 
neither of its Borneo neighbors was willing to extend either 
outright grants or unsecured loans to the struggling nation.  
This denial led to public denouncements by Riady, citing 
the “affluent” north had turned its back on their “brothers to 
the south”.  Riady swore to correct the “blatant and 
discriminatory economic inequality” that exists between the 
north and south.  Over the course of a few months, “One 
Borneo, One Nation” became not just a diplomatic theme; it 




Hostilities commenced shortly after a public statement 
by Riady, stating that Malaysia had been using off shore oil 
terminals to steal petroleum from Kalimantan fields.  He 
stated that Kalimantan would not sit idly by as the 
discriminatory north steals the very resources that it refused 
to help develop.  He made a call on the “Iban”, a Malaysian 
separatist movement, to help Kalimantan in the coming fight 
for economic equality.  Immediately after the public 
address, two Kalimantan army divisions began using air and 
amphibious forces to gain footholds in Malaysia.  The 1st 
Kalimantan Division (KD) landed near Kuching and began 
driving west through Malaysian territory.  The 3rd KD 
moved into Sandakan on the east coast of Malaysia, and 
began driving west towards Brunei.  Reportedly, KA naval 
forces laid sea mines in the Trusan Strait, effectively 
blocking Malaysian and Brunei naval forces. 
It is believed that KA forces are taking an operational 
pause to restructure their positions before advancing inland.  
Two divisions remain in the south near the Kalimantan 
capital of Banjarmasin.  While one is expected to remain 
near the capital, naval movements suggest the other may be 
used to reinforce units in place before the main force 
advances.  Malaysian and Brunei forces, outnumbered by 
the well equipped KA divisions, were forced to fall back to 
defensive positions.  Two Malaysian brigades are emplaced 
near Bitulu along the 1st KD’s expected line of advance.  
Two additional Malaysian brigades are near the city of Kota 
Kinabalu, blocking the 3rd KD drive towards Brunei.  Two 
battalions of Brunei troops are located in the capital city of 
Bandar Seri Begawan. 
Malaysia is requesting US assistance in preventing 
further loss of territory until it can mobilize troops to 
remove KA forces occupied in the region.  The mobilization 





The US will reinforce Malaysian units in order to deter 
further KA expedition and to support blue forces should 
deterrence fail.  The 10th Mountain Division will support 
forces near Kota Kinabalu, while the 3rd MEB will support 
forces near Bintulu.  The threat of sea mines will prevent the 
use of the major SPODs until MCM assets can clear the 
restricted waterways.  As such, forces will arrive via T-Craft 
to beach heads near friendly forces.  The sea base will 
consist of two MPF(F) squadrons, colocated to reduce naval 
security presence.  The MPF(F) ships will stage the US 
divisions and provide sustainment for them and allied 
Malaysian and Brunei forces. 
 
4.4. UN Security and Stability 
4.4.1. Background 
Nigeria, an Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) member, is important to world energy 
markets because it is one of the world's largest oil exporters. 
The Nigerian economy is largely dependent on its oil sector, 
which accounts for nearly 50% of Nigeria's gross domestic 
product (GDP) and 95% of the country's foreign exchange 
earnings. The country is a major oil supplier to the United 
States and Western Europe. Nigeria is today's fifth largest 
supplier of oil to the United States. (SOURCE: U.S. Energy 
Information Agency). 
Nigeria has been experiencing civil unrest, violence 
and strikes for several months. These problems stem from 
bitter competition among the country's estimated 250 ethnic 
groups, and religious strife between Muslims and 
Christians. The two largest ethnic groups, each comprised of 
tens of millions of Nigerians, are the Hausa in the north and 
the Yoruba in the south. In the past 30 years, Nigeria has 
careened between five military dictatorships and two 
democratically elected leaders. Nigeria's President Obasanjo 
is a Yoruban and former military commander. He is the 
second democratically elected president to serve as such in 
the past 30 years. The Hausa, however, controlled the 
former military government and dominate Nigeria's military 
today. 
Obasanjo's election has not calmed ethnic unrest. 
Locations of the latest outbreaks of violence include the 
Lagos area, southwestern Nigeria, the oil producing states in 
the southeast, and Kaduna. There has been an increase in the 
number of unauthorized vehicle checkpoints, operated by 
armed bands of police, soldiers, or bandits posing as or 
operating with po1ice or soldiers. Many incidents, including 
murder, illustrate the increasing risks of road travel in 
Nigeria. Reports of threats against firms and foreigners 
associated with the petroleum sector have been growing. 
This violence and unrest has hindered Nigerian oil 
production. Disturbances, including sabotage, occupation of 
oil facilities, hostage-taking and kidnapping, have occurred 
in many areas of the oil-producing Niger River Delta. 
Production disruptions have intensified recently. 
The U.S. Department of State lists 10,000 U.S. citizens 
living in Nigeria. Americans have not been specifically 
targeted in the disturbances. Nonetheless, they and their 
vehicles may inadvertently become caught up in a 
disturbance.   
Finally, Chevron said that saboteurs had deliberately 
spilled an estimated 2,000 barrels of oil from its pipeline in 
southern Nigeria. So far this year more than 50,000 barrels 
of oil have been spilled in 40 separate sabotage incidents. 
 
4.4.2. Scenario 
The Hausa-led military reversed last year's decision to 
hand over the government to a Yoruban civilian president. 
They took action, sweeping south from the Kaduna-Abuja 
region, while Obasanjo was on a state visit to Washington. 
The Army's chief, General Mtubi, has demanded Obasanjo's 
resignation and a return to military rule, while his staff has 
initiated negotiations with oil exporters on a "revised" 
payment schedule. The U.S. Department of State has 
refused to recognize the Mtubi regime. 
The military remains split between units loyal to the 
Yoruban government and the Mtubi regime.  Major battles 
have not broken out, but Mtubi units control the north and 
have indicated intent on taking first, Abuja, Nigeria’s 
capital, before marching south to take control of the oil 
producing regions. 
Obasanjo, on CNN, appeals for direct U.S. military 
assistance. He cites the familiar phrase "ethnic cleansing" in 
referring to an as yet unconfirmed report of hundreds of 




The US, leading a multinational peacekeeping force as 
authorized by the United Nations, will land the 22nd MEU 
and 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team with the goal of 
securing the Nigerian capital, protecting civilian 
populations, preventing further insurgency southward, and 
holding the Mtubi loyalist units in the north until a 
permanent peace can be restored.  The US is responsible for 
supplying its units as well has supporting the other nation 
units, totaling about a division equivalent. 
Due to the limited use of airports and the poor state of 
internal roadways, combined with the expedient nature of 
the operation, the US will land forces and supplies utilizing 
the navigable Niger River.  T-Craft will land all forces and 
30 days of supplies to a position as close to Abuja as the 
river allows.  A location 20 miles to the north of Lokoja has 
been identified as the logistics release point (LRP) due to its 
relative security and proximity to the major A-2 highway.  
Troops, equipment, and supplies will then be transferred via 
the highway to Camp Leo.  Camp Leo is the UN forces 
248
forward operating base, located near the capital.  Because 
the location is far inland, a refueling position will be 
established at the city of Onitsha.  The refueling position 
will refuel T-Craft during ingress and egress of the river. 
A sea base consisting of one MLP, one LMSR, and one 
MPF ship will be established approximately 25 nm from the 
entrance to the Niger River.  The relative security of the 
littorals allows for the sea base to be located close to shore 
and with limited naval protection. 
 
4.5. Humanitarian Aid / Disaster Relief 
4.5.1. Background 
In December 2004, a 9-magnitude earthquake struck 
deep under the Indian Ocean off the west coast of Sumatra, 
triggering massive tsunamis that wiped-out villages and 
resorts in six countries across the southern and southeast 
Asia coastlines.3  The destruction wrought by the tsunami 
was particularly severe in the Aceh Province of Indonesia, 
at the northwestern tip of the island of Sumatra. There entire 
villages were destroyed  within minutes as waves of thirty 
feet or more advanced far inland, while destruction of the 
main coastal highway made the entire region virtually 
inaccessible to Indonesian authorities ashore.  While reports 
of the destruction were slow in coming, by February 
estimates stated that 114,573 people had been killed, 
127,749 were missing, and over 400,000 had been 
displaced. 
Almost immediately, US Pacific Command Navy and 
MSC ships were dispatched to aid in the multinational 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 
operation.  Fleet assets included the Abraham Lincoln CSG, 
the Bonhomme Richard and Essex ESGs, Maritime 
Prepositioning Ships Squadron THREE and various MSC 




Naval forces utilizing a sea-based logistics train are 
uniquely suited for providing relief to the tsunami stricken 
region of Aceh on the northern coast of Sumatra.  Due to 
political and cultural concerns by the Jakarta government, 
US troops are not to remain ashore overnight.  Even with 
this restriction, there is widespread concern over the use of 
foreign troops in providing aid.  The US must coordinate a 
joint and combined logistics force to provide relief to 
remote areas with heavily damaged infrastructure and assist 
in recovery operations.  Again, due to political concerns, US 
involvement in the operation must conclude by March 2005. 
 
4.5.3. Action 
Historical analysis states that between the arrival of 
the first US ships on 01 January 2005 to the 
disestablishment of Combined Support Force 536 on 12 
February 2005, over 9.5 million pounds (4,750 tons) of aid 
was delivered, over half of which was delivered via 1,800 
helicopter sorties.  In this scenario, the T-Craft will be used 
as a mobile distribution hub.  Due to the limited crew, 
intermodal support, and organic capability of the craft, an 
augmented HADR “mission package” has been included 
with each sortie.  This mission package is similar to the 
concept employed by the Littoral Combat Ship.  This 
package consists of a second crew and aid workers; 
berthing, sanitation, and personnel transport modules; 
equipment to offload stores such as fork trucks and pallet 
jacks; and trucks with trailored small boats to be used for 
distribution to sites away from the landing area. The T-Craft 
will move vast amounts of aid to the primary refugee camp 
locations, move relief and medical teams, and establish 
temporary helicoptor pick-up sites.  These sites will reduce 
round-trip helicopter flights by up to 60 miles, greatly 
reducing the number of helicopter sorties required; thereby 
reducing flight hours, alleviate crew and maintenance team 
fatigue, and increase the rate of flow of aid to the shore.  
The sea base will consist of ships already in the 
area.  T-Craft connections will include the ESG ships Essex 
and Bonhomme Richard and the MPSRON ships Lummus, 
Hauge, Anderson, Bonnyman, and Martin for a total of eight 
potential T-Craft spots. 
 
5. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
To analyze the potential for “game changing” capability, a 
series of analysis tools will be used.  These tools include a 
capacity optimization using discrete modeling, a trade off 
study analyzing capacity, cargo capacity, speed, and 
maximum range using discrete modeling and spreadsheet 
analysis, and qualitative analyses on human factors and 
environmental/geographic operating environments. 
 
5.1. Craft Capacity Optimization 
It is assumed that different levels of conflict, as outlined 
by the Range of Military Operations, will require different 
numbers of T-Craft, or capacity.   To determine the proper 
number of T-Craft per each scenario, the authors will use 
discrete simulation (ExtendSim by Imagine That!™,) to 
vary the distance from shore to sea base, the cargo capacity 
of each craft, and the number of sea and shore spots.  To 
gauge efficiency, the model will report the utilization of the 
sea and shore spots and the amount of time incurred in 
queues waiting to be serviced at sea or ashore.  The goal 
will be to maximize spot utilization while minimize queue 
waiting time.  This analysis will suggest a feasible number 
of craft to be used in each scenario and will help provide a 
starting point to force structure and fleet CONOPS for T-
Craft operation. 
 
5.2. Tradeoff Study 
Using the capacity numbers from the optimization 
explained above and other variables determined in each 
249
threat scenario, a tradeoff study will be conducted by 
varying the cargo capacity and operating speed of each 
craft.   This tradeoff will add quantitative data to the design 
and operating parameters of the craft.  The resulting analysis 
will help determine effective mixes of cargo capacity, 
speed, and sea base range for each scenario. 
Although costs associated with each variable are not 
addressed in this study, the performance marks associated 
with each variable will give design teams and decision-
makers insight into the potential benefits of pairing certain 
parameters when viewed together as a system alternative. 
 
5.3. Human Factors 
 Separate from the above analysis, the authors will 
use qualitative analysis to address the BAA requirements of 
1) No habitability/living spaces required, 2) no organic 
capabilities to handle pallets, quad-cons, or 20ft containers, 
and 3) Crew size of 3 (threshold), 2 (objective). 
  Although these requirements will not be modeled 
as above, the authors will use their operational experience 
and the insight of other subject matter experts to address the 
effects these requirements may have on operational 
employment from a human systems integration paradigm. 
 
5.4. Environmental Factors 
 As with the human factors assessment, the authors 
will use a separate analysis of meteorological and surf-zone 
geography to assess the BAA requirements of 1) Beach 
slope climbing of .5% (threshold), 2% (objective) and 2) 
operate at speeds of 40 knots in Sea State 4. 
 While the goal should be to maximize the number 
of beaches the T-Craft can use for landing, the 2% objective 
slope is significantly less than the current 5% slope 
attainable by the US Navy’s Landing Craft Air Cushion 
(LCAC).  The authors will use geographic data to determine 
the percentage of beaches world-wide approachable by T-
Craft.   
 Similarly, the authors will use meteorological data 
to determine the game changing significance of being able 
to operate at sea state 4 when considering scenario-
geography weather statistics and the constraints weather 
plays on other assets in the sea base. 
 
6. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The limited scope and nature of this study demand that 
certain simplifications be adopted in order to complete the 
project on time and within given resources.  To that extent, 
the following assumptions and limitations are noted. 
 
6.1. Assumptions 
The T-Craft is operating as both an expeditionary 
connector and logistics connector.  As such, with the 
assumed limited force protection capabilities of the craft, it 
is assumed that a Sea Shield is in place and capable of 
protecting the craft throughout its operation. 
The ability to dock to a sea base is a critical 
technology requirement that is challenging design teams 
working on the T-Craft and the sea base concept.  Although 
not a proven capability, it is assumed that the craft is 
capable of docking at a sea spot and transferring the 
required cargo load.  Similarly, it is assumed that the time to 
dock at a sea spot is similar to the time required to dock a 
current connector (LCAC, LCU, etc) in the well deck of 
amphibious class ship (LHA, LPD, LSD, etc). 
For modeling purposes, the required cargo throughput 
is simulated using standard training serial loads, as found in 
SEAOPS Volume IV.4  Detailed planning is conducted by 
trained and experience cargo officers prior to moving the 
vast amounts of vehicles, cargo, and personnel.  In order to 
simplify this process and to have a basis for cargo load 
times, the training serials are meant to reflect the types of 
serials that could be move by T-Craft, and estimate the 
throughput times associated with the different loads.  
Onload and offload times are a function of LCAC load 
times, multiplied by a factor of 4, 6, 8, or 10, and divided by 
two to allow for the parallel loading of equipment.  This 
methodology has been reviewed by Loadmaster Instructors 
at Naval Beach Group ONE and has been deemed feasible 
for this study. 
 
6.2. Limitations 
The scenarios were developed to flex the game 
changing nature of the craft, and as such make use of T-
Craft has the sole or nearly sole logistics connector.  As 
such, there are added threats that prevent the use of current 
connectors and docking of the sea base ships to sea ports of 
departure (SPOD).  It is acknowledged that a mixed force 
structure is best to reflect a realistic operation, but the 
insight gained in this study will enable future work 
including mixed force structure utilization. 
Other simulation methods, such as agent based 
modeling software like ARENA or Naval Simulation 
System could better capture the interactions inherent in a 
complex expeditionary logistics structure.  However, the 
simple analysis tools used in this study were purposely used 
to demonstrate how these tools can be used to address high 
level issues relevant to military operations. 
 
7. ON-GOING WORK 
Using the framework detailed in this report, the authors 
will complete the analysis before the project ends in July 
2009.  The authors will issue a final report detailing the 
findings of the project, and propose follow-on studies that 
will assist ONR, design teams, and decision-makers as the 
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